Philosophy
Finding Mind: Why the Origin of Mind Requires Updating Our Definition of Computation
“Prolegomena to finding mind.” — Lucius Meredith (Feb 2026)
In brief: The project argues that telling a serious story about the origin of mind requires first updating the reader’s default story about what computation is. Information-theoretic approaches are showing up across domains: aging, black holes, AI cognition models. It reframes the hard problem of consciousness as ‘What is it like to be a computer program?’
Key takeaways
- The project argues that telling a serious story about the origin of mind requires first updating the reader’s default story about what computation is.
- Information-theoretic approaches are showing up across domains: aging, black holes, AI cognition models.
- It reframes the hard problem of consciousness as ‘What is it like to be a computer program?’
Key questions
- What definition of computation is rich enough to support a theory of mind?
- How does the information-theoretic lens change what we build?
- Is ‘what is it like to be a computer program?’ a tractable question?
Why it matters for developers
The models we choose for computation shape what kinds of minds and agents we believe are possible — and how we evaluate them.
philosophy of mind
computation
consciousness
information theory
origin of mind